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Of Trumpeters, Pipers, and Swingmen: What
Tune Is the Burger Court Playing in Right to
Representation Cases?
I. PRELUDE: THE HISTORY OF AND PROBLEMS IN RIGHT TO
REPRESENTATION CASES'
One hundred and forty years after its embodiment in the sixth
amendment, 2 the right to counsel was proclaimed by the Supreme
Court as a meaningful constitutional right;3 since that proclama-
tion, the right at trial has been expanded intermittently yet consis-
tently, but attachment of the right at stages of the criminal process
other than trial and collateral questions concerning the right have
been the subjects of considerable controversy and confusion. Re-
garding the right at trial, the Supreme Court during the 1930's
decided two key cases: the first was Powell v. Alabama,4 the 1932
proclamation case, which established the right to appointed counsel
for indigents in federal capital offense cases,5 and the second was
Johnson v. Zerbst,6 which extended the right to appointed counsel
for indigents in all federal criminal cases. 7 Later, in Betts v. Brady,'
a 1942 decision in which due process rather than sixth amendment
reasoning was applied, the Court found against the defendant and
seemingly slowed expansion of the right to state criminal cases by
holding that appointment of counsel for indigents was necessary
only if the totality of circumstances demanded the presence of coun-
sel. Nevertheless, application of this special circumstances ap-
proach did not restrict the right as much as might have been ex-
1. Because the Burger Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), has held
recently that a constitutional right to proceed without counsel exists, that Court's cases
concerning the presence or absence of counsel will be designated as "right to representation"
rather than "right to counsel" cases.
2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Prior to Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), an accused enjoyed a constitutional
right to employ counsel. The right was made "meaningful" when a constitutional right to
appointment of counsel was "proclaimed."
4. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5. The Court in Powell also spoke for the first time of effective representation. Techni-
cally, however, the holding in Powell was based on due process and not sixth amendment
reasoning.
6. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
7. The Court in Johnson employed, for the first time, sixth amendment reasoning in
holding for the right to appointment of counsel. The Court in Johnson also said, for the first
time, that a waiver of counsel must be express.
8. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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pected In 1963, during the Warren Court era, the Court rendered
Gideon v. Wainwright,'0 which is still the most dramatic decision in
the right to counsel area. Gideon, which overruled Betts, incorpo-
rated the sixth amendment right to counsel into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and hence extended the right
to appointed counsel to indigents in all state felony cases." Re-
cently, the Burger Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin'2 has expanded
further the right to appointed counsel for indigents in many state
misdemeanor cases. Although Gideon resolved the question of the
sixth amendment's incorporation into the fourteenth amendment
for trial purposes, the decision also provocatively opened the ques-
tion whether the right to counsel attaches at other stages of the
criminal process, both pretrial and post-trial. This latter issue was
treated only lightly before Gideon'3 and remains a matter of contro-
versy. While the key decisions of the Warren Court after Gideon
expanded the right toward both ends of the spectrum-from the
trial center back to interrogation and identification and forward to
sentencing and appeal-the decisions of the Burger Court have been
much more chaotic, expanding the right on some occasions and
restricting it on others, in both directions. Further adding to the
confusion is the Burger Court's recent decision concerning an impor-
tant collateral question: in Faretta v. California'4 the Court held
that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to proceed with-
out counsel.
In order to understand better the seemingly disharmonious
tune of the Burger Court in the right to representation cases, a closer
analysis of the Warren Court's key right to counsel cases after
9. One commentator has stated:
In the cases following Betts, . . . [flactors [that] the Court considered in determining
whether due process requirements were met in each specific case included the capacity
of the criminal defendant-his age, ignorance, illiteracy, and inexperience; the complex-
ity of the criminal proceeding-the showing of substantial error in the proceeding indi-
cating that counsel had in fact been needed; and, finally, the severity of the penalty to
be imposed on the unsuccessful defendant.
Comment, The Continuing Expansion of the Right to Counsel, 41 U. CoLo. L. REV. 473, 476
(1969).
10. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11. The Court in Gideon also held that its ruling was retroactive; therefore, those state
prisoners who without counsel and without waiver of counsel had been convicted of felonies
before Gideon could attack their convictions.
12. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
13. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (right to appointment of counsel
attaches at arraignment in which defenses will be lost if not pleaded); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956) (state must provide free transcript to indigent defendant who is appealing).
14. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
19761
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Gideon will be helpful, both because these cases are important as
precedents and because they illuminate proclivities of the Warren
Court in this constitutional area.' 5 In the three years following
Gideon, the Warren Court decided three cases that were significant
for, among other reasons, the variety of their rationales. In Douglas
v. California'6 the Court relied on the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to hold that states must provide free counsel
to indigents on appeals granted by the states as a right. One year
later in Escobedo v. Illinois'7 the Court, applying sixth amendment
reasoning, recognized a right to retained counsel during police sta-
tion interrogations. Subsequently in Miranda v. Arizona'" the Court
employed the self-incrimination provision of the fifth amendment
to grant a right to appointed counsel during custodial interroga-
tions. Although the Court in Miranda reemphasized its fear, earlier
expressed in Escobedo, of the coercive nature of police tactics, the
Court's reliance in Miranda on the fifth amendment cast considera-
ble doubt on the possibility of applying the sixth amendment rea-
soning of Escobedo to other pretrial situations. In 1967, the Warren
Court rendered five variegated decisions. In In re Gault'9 the Court
held that the right to counsel attaches at those juvenile proceedings
in which institutional confinement could result. Determining ini-
tially in Gault that juvenile proceedings are not criminal prosecu-
tions and hence not sixth amendment prosecutions, the Court then
decided, on the basis of due process reasoning, that the possible
sanctions of institutional confinement and negligible treatment are
so severe that the presence of counsel is necessary to protect the
privilege against self-incrimination and to protect the rights of con-
frontation and cross-examination. In United States v. Wade'" and
Stovall v. Denno2' the Warren Court dealt with the right to counsel
in the context of pretrial identifications. Speaking of the suggestion
inherent in identifications, much as the Court in Miranda had spo-
ken of the compulsion inherent in interrogations, the Court in Wade
voiced regard for enhancing the fairness of the eventual trial and
accorded a sixth amendment right to counsel to protect the other
sixth amendment rights of confrontation and cross-examination.
15. See generally Stephens, The Assistance of Counsel and the Warren Court: Post-
Gideon Developments in Perspective, 74 DICK. L. REv. 193 (1969).
16. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
17. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
21. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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The holding in Wade, however, concerned only the right to counsel
at post-indictment lineups and hence left unclear both the applica-
tion of the right to other identifications and the chronological point
of attachment. Stovall was significant because the Court created
criteria for determining whether to accord retroactivity to rules
embodied in new right to counsel cases22 and because the Court
noted the possibility that, even if the sixth amendment would not
apply to certain pretrial identification situations, due process
might. In finding against the defendant, however, the Court in
Stovall refused to give retroactivity to the Wade holding and deter-
mined that the lineup in Stovall was not so suggestive as to violate
due process. Although the Warren Court in Stovall refused to accord
retroactivity to the Wade holding and hence left in doubt greater
expansion of the right in pretrial cases, the Court subsequently in
Burgett v. Texas2 granted further retroactivity to the Gideon hold-
ing 24 and in Mempha v. Rlzay2 continued expansion in post-trial
cases. In Burgett, which concerned a counseled felony conviction
obtained after Gideon but the evidentiary use of uncounseled felony
convictions obtained before Gideon, the Court held that, when a
defendant is tried under a recidivist statute, use of prior felony
convictions, obtained without counsel and without waiver of coun-
sel, causes the defendant to suffer anew and cannot be employed
either to support guilt or to increase punishment. In Mempha the
Court held that, when a defendant has been convicted but has been
placed on probation with sentencing deferred, the right to counsel
attaches at a probation revocation hearing. From these eight key
cases after Gideon, certain conclusions can be drawn regarding the
tendencies of the Warren Court in the right to counsel area .2 First,
although never confronting directly the issue of standards for indi-
gency, the Warren Court was obviously sympathetic to the plight
of the poor. Secondly, the Warren Court viewed the right to counsel
not only as a sixth amendment right but also as a right that was
22. Those criteria are: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the
extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards and (c) the effect
on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Id. at 297.
23. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
24. See note 11 supra.
25. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
26. The conclusions to be drawn concern the tendencies of the majority within the
Warren Court. Justice White ominously voted against the right to counsel in 5 of the 8 key
cases, dissenting in Escobedo, Miranda, Wade, and Burgett, and concurring in Stovall. Jus-
tice Stewart, even more ominously, voted against the right in 6 of the 8 cases, dissenting in
Douglas, Escobedo, Miranda, Gault, and Wade, and concurring in Stovall.
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supportive of other constitutional provisions. 27 Finally, the Warren
Court, possibly for these reasons, almost always was willing to ex-
pand the right to counsel to both pretrial and post-trial stages of the
criminal process.
Six years after Gideon, the Warren Court became the Burger
Court in name because the previous Chief Justice was replaced by
the new Chief Justice; shortly thereafter, the new Court became the
Burger Court in fact because Justices Fortas, Harlan, and Black
were replaced by Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Powell. As it
faced the multifaceted right to representation issue, the Burger
Court was subjected to three divergent pulls. First, the Court was
confronted, as the Warren Court had been, with the variable ver-
biage of the sixth amendment, a pliable provision narrow enough to
cover almost nothing and broad enough to cover almost everything. 2
Secondly, another pull, again faced by both Courts, was the restric-
tive resistance to reform of the lower courts, 29 which have had a
conscientious concern for the needs of society and the allocation of
manpower, money, and time.3" A final pull was the liberal legacy of
the Warren Court, 31 which had been concerned with the needs of
27. "The [Warren] Court [was] willing to engage in as much 'amendment jumping'
as necessary to expand the doctrine of right to counsel, because the Court [considered]
counsel to be the paladin of fairness to the accused." Steele, The Doctrine of Right to Counsel:
Its Impact on the Administration of Criminal Justice and the Legal Profession, 23 Sw. L.J.
488, 495 (1969).
28. One commentator has stated:
The words "criminal prosecutions" and "defence" are too narrow because it strains their
plain meaning to extend their import to some of the modern stages of the criminal
continuum . . . . It may reasonably be argued that it was the recognition of just such
limitations [that] caused the Supreme Court to use the fifth amendment as the ration-
ale for Miranda ....
. . . The words "criminal prosecutions," "accused," and "defence" as used in the
sixth amendment. . . do not set any. . . limits. . . to any particular level of criminal
prosecutions. In this respect the langauge of the sixth amendment is overly broad ....
The Court seemed to have this fact in mind when it decided Betts ....
Id. at 491.
29. See, e.g., Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 785 (1970).
30. The enormity of the allocation problem is illustrated by the following statistics:
Each year, approximately 350,000 felony arrests are made; of those arrested, approximately
250,000 cannot afford a lawyer. Each year, approximately 5,000,000 misdemeanor arrests are
made; of those arrested, approximately 1,250,000 cannot afford a lawyer. Each year, approxi-
mately 50,000,000 traffic cases occur. See generally Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel:
Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 601 (1975); Rossman, The Scope of the Sixth
Amendment: Who Is A Criminal Defendant, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 663 (1975); Steele, supra
note 27.
31. As used in the text, "liberal" means willing to side with the defendant by expanding
the right to representation. As discussed in the text, the Warren Court after Gideon was
"liberal" in 7 of its 8 key right to counsel cases.
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individuals vis-d-vis the power of police, prosecution, and judiciary.
Thus in the context of the Constitution, the Burger Court has had
to face a constant question in the right to representation cases: How
best to balance the needs of society and the needs of individuals?
At the time of this Note, the Burger Court has faced this ques-
tion for six years, the same span of time in which the Warren Court
after Gideon established its liberal legacy. As the accompanying
chart reveals, the sixteen right to representation decisions of the
Burger Court during this period have been split equally, eight ex-
tending and eight restricting the right. This split obviously has
slowed the momentum of the Warren Court decisions. As the ac-
companying chart also demonstrates, the members of the Burger
Court have been split equally into three voting blocs. Although
Gideon v. Wainwright was an unanimous decision by the Warren
Court for the defendant, those who almost always have blown the
trumpet of Gideon (the accused) are Justices Douglas, Brennan,
and Marshall. Although Argersinger v. Hamlin was also an unani-
mous decision by the Burger Court for the defendant, those who
almost always have followed the piper of Hamlin (the government)
are Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist.
This conflict between the "Trumpeters" and the "Pipers" was made
even more clamorous by the clashing contentions of Justice Douglas
and Chief Justice Burger, but the recent retirement of Justice Doug-
las has ended this second six-year era. Nevertheless, because two
members of his group still remain and because all three members
of the third bloc, the "Swingmen," still remain, it is important to
analyze the Burger Court decisions of that six-year period. Thus the
purpose of this Note is to reveal and review the reasonings and
voting patterns of the three blocs, to scrutinize the substance and
scope of the decisions, and to attempt to predict the implications
of those factors for further cases-in effect, to recognize the tune the
Burger Court is playing in the right to representation cases.
II. FUGUE: THE BLOCS
As the accompanying chart demonstrates, the first of two major
points to be drawn from a bloc analysis of the Burger Court's sixteen
right to representation cases during its initial six years is that the
"Trumpeters" vbted together ninety-four percent of the time and
voted for the right in more than eighty percent of the cases, while
the "Pipers" voted together one hundred percent of the time and
voted against the right in more than eighty percent of those cases.
Why have the "Trumpeters" and the "Pipers" differed so often?
One obvious answer resides in their competing philosophies.
[Vol. 29:776
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In their right to representation opinions, Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall echoed and accentuated the Warren Court's
sympathy for the oppressed individual and fear of governmental
power: these three Justices stressed the impotency of the impover-
ished defendant and the potential potency of officials who could be
"'motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or
jealousy.' "32 The three Justices not only showed a strong distrust of
the instrumentalities of government-police, prosecutors, courts,
and other governmental forces-but also expressed a rigorous regard
for procedural regularity and reform to protect the accused. Typi-
cally, Justice Marshall spoke of "'higher values than speed and
efficiency,' -31 and Justice Brennan spoke of "grave dangers that an
innocent defendant might be convicted. ' 3 Thus these three Justices
engaged in a kind of prophylactic reasoning process,3" the main tenet
of which was that, to protect the accused and to combat the superior
resources and advantages of government, the individual defendant
should be accorded all possible tools" 'whenever necessary to assure
a meaningful "defense." ,,36
By contrast, in their right to representation opinions, Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist voiced the
fears and faiths of the lower courts: these three Justices stressed the
interests of society in the orderly administration of the criminal
process37 and showed a strong trust in the instrumentalities of that
system.38 Additionally, they unveiled an underlying belief in the
32. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 586 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 583 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting from Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
90-91 n.22 (1972)).
34. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 338 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. See, for Justice Douglas: Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 593 (1974) (dissent);
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 286 (1972) (dis-
sent); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 14 (1970) (concurrence); for Justice Brennan: United
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 326 (1973) (dissent); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972)
(dissent); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970);
for Justice Marshall: Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 580 (1974) (dissent); Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 269 (1973) (dissent).
36. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 341 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
from United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 225 (1967)).
37. See, for Chief Justice Burger: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975)
(dissent); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (concurrence); Brooks v. Tennessee,
406 U.S. 605, 613 (1972) (dissent); Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 485 (1972) (dissent); for Justice
Blackmun: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 846 (1975) (dissent); for Justice Rehnquist:
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975) (dissent); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
38. See, for Chief Justice Burger: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (dis-
sent); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 613 (1972) (dissent); for Justice Blackmun: Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 846 (1975) (dissent); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973);
for Justice Rehnquist: Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975) (dissent); Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 617 (1972) (dissent).
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guilt of most criminal defendants.39 Consequently, these factors led
to a literal reading of the Constitution" and to a refusal to follow
precedent. At his first significant opportunity, Chief Justice Burger
set the tone for this position when he stated:
I do not acquiesce in prior holdings that purportedly, but nonetheless erro-
neously, are based on the Constitution.
* * * I am bound to reject categorically. . . that what the Court said lately
controls over the Constitution. While our holdings are entitled to deference I
will not join in employing recent cases rather than the Constitution, to boot-
strap ourselves into a result . . ..
The second significant, although more subtle, point to be drawn
from the accompanying chart and from a bloc analysis is that, after
Justice Powell joined the Burger Court, the "Swingmen" voted to-
gether in nine of those last eleven cases and, even more importantly,
their votes swung to make a majority in eight of these eleven cases.
Accordingly, each of the "Swingmen" not only voted in the majority
in over ninety percent of the cases but also voted for the right to
representation only about half of the time. As this last figure indi-
cates, the "Swingmen," Justices White, Powell, and Stewart, fa-
vored alternately the views of the "Trumpeters" and those of the
"Pipers." On some occasions they emphasized concern for individu-
als,42 regard for procedural regularity and reform,4" and the need for
tools to combat the advantages of government,4 while on other occa-
sions they emphasized concern for society," faith in the instrumen-
talities of the criminal system,4" and the need for the orderly admin-
39. See, for Chief Justice Burger: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (dis-
sent); Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 485 (1972) (dissent); for Justice Blackmun: Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 846 (1975) (dissent); Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 494 (1972) (dis-
sent); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449 (1972) (dissent); for Justice Rehnquist:
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975) (dissent); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258
(1973).
40. See, for Chief Justice Burger: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (dis-
sent); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (concurrence); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605, 613 (1972) (dissent); Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 485 (1972) (dissent); Adams v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 285 (1972) (concurrence); for Justice Blackmun: Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 846 (1975) (dissent); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Adams v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 286 (1972) (concurrence); for Justice Rehnquist: Herring v. New York,
422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975) (dissent); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 617 (1972) (dissent).
41. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 22 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
42. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
43. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
44. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
45. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
46. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
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istration of that process.47 Individually, Justices Powell and Stewart
seemed more philosophically coherent and hence more persuasive
than Justice White. Justice Powell, along with Justice White,
stressed the importance of flexibility. 8 Specifically Justice Powell,
both with respect to the fourteenth amendment and with respect to
the sixth amendment, urged the concept of fundamental fairness:
"I would adhere to the principle of due process that requires funda-
mental fairness in criminal trials . . . ."I Justice Stewart, along
with Justice White, both former members of the Warren Court,
stressed the importance of precedent." Specifically Justice Stewart
urged an approach that emphasized fairness at trial: "I [think]
that the right to counsel is essentially a protection for the defendant
at trial ... ."51 Thus these three Justices felt that the right to
representation in situations other than at trial should be expanded
only "as rapidly as practicable" 52 but that the right at trial should
be expanded with "no restrictions."53
In summary, a bloc analysis of the voting patterns indicates two
propositions. First, when the question of right to representation at
trial is raised, the Burger Court would seem inclined to play in at
least two-part and possibly even three-part harmony: the "Trum-
peters" would support expansion because that group almost always
supports expansion; the "Swingmen" would support expansion be-
cause they view fairness at trial as a paramount priority; and the
"Pipers" would seem disposed to support expansion because the
Constitution specifically speaks of "criminal prosecutions." Sec-
ondly, when the question of right to representation at other stages
in the criminal process is raised, the "Swingmen" determine the
majority melody. Just what tune the entire Burger Court actually
plays at each stage is the subject of the following discussion.
(1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring); Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
47. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
44 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
48. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
49. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 47, (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
50. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 705 (1972) (White, J., dissenting); Loper v. Beto, 405
U.S. 473, 485 (1972) (White, J., concurring); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 17 (1970)
(White, J., concurring).
51. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 324 n. (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
52. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 66 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
53. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975).
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HI. SYMPHONY: THE CASES
At the time the sixth amendment was written the most conspicuous stage of
the criminal justice process was the trial stage where the question of guilt and
punishment were adjudicated. Accordingly, the right to counsel as written in
the sixth amendment was probably intended to encompass counsel at trial
only. As new stages were recognized and developed through the years, the
criminal justice process grew into a series of interdependent stages in the form
of a continuum.-4
Accordingly, the Burger Court's right to representation cases will be
analyzed in the context of this criminal continuum and not in the
order in which the cases were decided, because the continuum
concept best explains the developments of the decisions and best
clarifies the positions of the blocs. In conjunction with these devel-
opments and positions, the concept also best aids in attempting to
predict the future course of the Burger Court in the right to repre-
sentation cases.
A. Pretrial
In the pretrial area the Burger Court decided three significant
cases, whose respective opinions, appropriately enough, were writ-
ten by a representative from each of the three different blocs. The
Court also decided a fourth case that determined whether retroac-
tivity would be accorded to the holding of one of the former three
cases.
In United States v. Ash55 and Kirby v. Illinois" the Court dealt
with the right to counsel in the context of pretrial identifications.
As compared to the issue in Wade of right to counsel at lineups, the
Court in Ash faced the question of right to counsel at photographic
displays. In his opinion for the Ash Court, Justice Blackmun fo-
cused strictly on the sixth amendment and investigated its histori-
cal background. From this investigation he decided that the tradi-
tional test calls for an examination of the event to determine
whether it is so similar to trial as to become part of the trial. He
concluded, "[The event must be] a trial-like confrontation, requir-
ing the 'Assistance of Counsel' to preserve the adversary process by
compensating for advantages of the prosecuting authorities." 7 Ac-
cordingly, because photographic displays are not trial-like confron-
tations, the Court in Ash held that "the Sixth Amendment does not
54. Steele, supra note 27, at 522.
55. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
56. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
57. 413 U.S. 300, 314 (1973).
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grant the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by the
Government for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an
identification of the offender."58 As compared to the issue in Wade
of right to counsel at lineups after formal charges have been filed,
the Court in Kirby faced the question of right to counsel at showups
before formal charges have been filed. In his opinion for the Kirby
Court, Justice Stewart distinguished Miranda and also Escobedo as
merely fifth amendment cases and focused strictly on the sixth
amendment as applied through the fourteenth amendment. In at-
tempting to determine at what critical stage criminal prosecutions
begin, he decided,
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings . . . is the starting point of
our whole system of adversary criminal justice . . . It is then that a defen-
dant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and
immersed in the intricacies of substantive and judicial criminal law. It is this
point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the "criminal prosecutions"
to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applica-
ble."9
He concluded, "[A] person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary
judicial proceedings have been initiated against him."' " Accord-
ingly, the Court gave constitutional sanction explicitly to uncoun-
seled showups and implicitly to uncounseled lineups that are con-
ducted before the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings.
In Coleman v. Alabama6' and Adams v. Illinois2 the Court
dealt with whether a right to appointed counsel attaches at a pre-
liminary hearing prior to indictment. In his opinion for the Court
in Coleman, Justice Brennan used the familiar critical stage lan-
guage but employed prophylactic reasoning 3 to find that, on the
58. Id. at 321.
59. 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).
60. Id. at 688.
61. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
62. 405 U.S. 278 (1972).
63. Justice Brennan stated:
Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary hearing is essential to protect the
indigent accused against an erroneous or improper prosecution. First, the lawyer's skilled
examination and cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the
State's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in
any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion a
vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the trial,
or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not appear at the
trial. Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover the case the State has against
his client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at
the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in making
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basis of the sixth amendment as applied through the fourteenth
amendment, the right does attach at those preliminary hearings. In
Adams the Court dealt with the application of one aspect of Stovall
in determining whether the Coleman holding was to be given re-
troactivity. In his opinion for the Court in Adams, Justice Brennan
ruled,
We hold that. . . the role of counsel at the preliminary hearing differs suffi-
ciently from the role of counsel at trial in its impact upon the integrity of the
factfinding process as to require the weighing of the probabilities of such infec-
tion against the elements of prior justified reliance and the impact of retroac-
tivity upon the administration of criminal justice."
Because the latter two factors outweighed the former factor, the
Court refused to accord retroactivity to the Coleman holding.
Although severe criticism has accompanied the rationales,'
holdings,66 and results67 of Ash and Kirby, the voting patterns in
those two cases and in Coleman and Adams closely followed form:
the "Pipers" voted against the right to counsel in every instance; the
"Trumpeters" voted for the right in every instance (except for Jus-
tice Brennan's inexplicable stance in Adams); and the "Swingmen"
oscillated between the two positions. Justice Powell voted with the
Burger group in the two decisions in which he participated, and
Justice Stewart, with his antipathy for the holdings in Escobedo,
Miranda, and Wade,6" also voted with the Burger group in each of
the four cases. Justice White, however, who had a similar antipathy
for the holdings in those Warren Court cases, 9 still felt compelled
to follow their precedent and hence voted for the right to counsel in
Coleman and Kirby. He also followed the Stovall precedent in vot-
effective arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early psychi-
atric examination or bail.
399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
64. 405 U.S. 278, 281 (1972).
65. "[A]rrest can be made with or without a judicially authorized warrant. Arguably
therefore, a suspect arrested under a warrant would have immediate protection . . . while
one arrested without a warrant would have to wait for judicial involvement before the right
to counsel would attach." Note, The Pretrial Right to Counsel, 26 STAN. L. REV. 399, 413 n.81
(1974).
66. See, e.g., Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Re-
main Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 717 (1974); Pretrial
Right, supra note 65.
67. Scientific studies have amply demonstrated the dangers of mistake in human per-
ception and identification. . . .Many cases of wrongful conviction have been reported. ...
[I]n one of the most dramatic, seventeen witnesses mistakenly identified the accused. Often
the actual offender and the defendant did not resemble each other." Danger of Convicting
the Innocent, supra note 66, at 796.
68. See note 26 supra.
69. Id.
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ing against the right in Adams, but he apparently felt free, in also
voting against the right in Ash, to disregard the Wade precedent
because of the arguable distinguishability of photographic displays
and lineups.
From these observations and from the four cases, a number of
conclusions can be drawn regarding the present status of and the
future possibilities for the right to representation in the pretrial area
under the Burger Court. First, unlike the Warren Court, the Burger
Court in this area is unwilling to look outside the sixth amendment
to either the self-incrimination provision of the fifth amendment or
due process for a rationale for the right to counsel. Thus the applica-
tion of the holdings in Escobedo and Miranda will be limited to
interrogations, and although due process was mentioned in each of
the four cases as a possible rationale for the right to counsel, the
chances for successful application of due process are slim. 0 Sec-
ondly, for the pragmatic present, the presence of counsel is not a
constitutional necessity at photographic displays at any time and
is not required at lineups or showups until after formal charges have
been filed. Finally, for the philosophical future, the Burger Court
seems disposed to grant the right to counsel at trial-like confronta-
tions at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings.
Although this rationale was used to restrict the right to counsel in
Ash and Kirby, it also could be employed to extend the right to a
pretrial situation other than that in Coleman. Indeed, Justice Stew-
art in Kirby said as much when he listed a litany of these situations:
"formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment."" This extension may not occur, however, if the real
reason for the decisions in Ash and Kirby was a feeling that the
chances of prejudice in a pretrial situation are too low and the costs
of administration too high.12 In any event, as the discussion of the
next subject will show, the clear trend of the Burger Court cases is
to emphasize and scrutinize trial situations. Thus in lieu of granting
70. One commentator has stated:
Since Stovall, the Court has certainly displayed no particular readiness to find due
process violations. Furthermore, it has been willing to balance suggestive practices
against the need for the practice employed ....
All factors considered, it should be the rare defendant who is able to take advantage of
the due process objection under Stovall and succeeding cases . . . . [T]he remaining
protection for the accused at pretrial identifications is slim indeed.
Pretrial Right, supra Perspective, 74 DICK. L. REv. n.108.
71. 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
72. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (The Court strongly implied that appoint-
ment of counsel was not necessary at informal judicial probable cause determination).
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the right to counsel in other pretrial situations, the Burger Court
could be receptive to requiring methods that might increase fairness
at trial-methods such as a lineup in court or the defendant's relo-
cation among spectators or the judge's giving cautionary jury in-
structions concerning the dangers of misidentification.
B. Trial
In the trial area the Burger Court decided five cases, four of
which were of seemingly narrow significance except that, in all four,
the rights of defendants at trial were extended through right to
counsel rationales. In all four also, "Swingman" Justice Stewart
either wrote the Court opinion or, in one instance, filed an impor-
tant concurring opinion. The fifth case was of major significance
both because of its present expansive effects and because of its
broad implications for the future. That Court opinion, appropri-
ately, was written by Justice Douglas.
The former four cases will be discussed again not in the order
in which they were decided but in the order in which their situations
would appear at trial: testimony, impeachment, closing, and sent-
encing. In Brooks v. Tennessee73 in invalidating a state statute that
had required defendants to testify first or not at all, Justice Brennan
in his opinion for the Court initially relied on the prophylactic self-
incrimination provision of the fifth amendment. He then alterna-
tively relied on the sixth amendment as applied through the four-
teenth amendment by stating, "[R]equiring the accused and his
lawyer to make that choice without an opportunity to evaluate the
actual worth of their evidence . . . restricts the defense-par-
ticularly counsel-in the planning of its case." Justice Stewart
concurred with the latter view and relied on somewhat similar
sixth amendment reasoning in the other three cases. In Loper v.
Beto" the prosecution, with the aid of impeachment evidence of
un'counseled felony convictions prior to Gideon, had obtained a
felony conviction against the defendant also prior to Gideon.
Thus because of these facts, Justice Stewart and the Court were
faced with whether to grant the Gideon holding complete retro-
activity as to guilt, an issue distinguishable from the question in
Burgett because no recidivist statute was present in Loper and,
more importantly, because the counseled felony conviction in Loper
73. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
74. Id. at 612.
75. 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
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had been obtained prior to Gideon. Although refusing to consider
whether prior uncounseled felony convictions could be used to im-
peach specific statements made by defendants, the Court otherwise
gave the question in Loper its broadest possible answer as to guilt.7
In Herring v. New York7 7 in invalidating a state statute that had
allowed judges in nonjury cases to deny any opportunity for summa-
tion, Justice Stewart in his opinion for the Court relied on the sixth
amendment as applied through the fourteenth amendment and
again employed his fair trial reasoning by stating, "The very prem-
ise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advo-
cacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective
that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free. 78 In United
States v. Tucker7 the facts were similar to those in Loper. In Tucker
the trial judge took into consideration evidence of uncounseled
felony convictions prior to Gideon and sentenced the defendant
after a counseled felony conviction also obtained prior to Gideon.
Thus because of these facts, Justice Stewart and the Court were
faced with whether to grant the Gideon holding complete retro-
activity, this time as to punishment, an issue distinguishable from
the question in Burgett again because no recidivist statute was
present in Tucker and again because the sentencing in Tucker had
occurred prior to Gideon. The Court, this time as to punishment,
gave the question in Tucker the same broadest possible answer.
Just as the holdings in Ash and Kirby were the most dramatic
restrictions on the right to counsel by the Burger Court, the holding
in Argersinger v. Hamlin"° was the most dramatic extension of that
right by the Court. Whereas the issue in Gideon had concerned the
right to appointed counsel at felony prosecutions, the Court in
Argersinger encountered the question of the right at prosecutions in
76. One commentator has stated:
The Supreme Court had four alternatives open to it in deciding the retroactivity issue
in Loper. First, it could have decided that the Loper decision would be applied only
prospectively. Secondly, the Court could have applied Loper retroactively to all convic-
tions similar to Loper obtained subsequent to Burgett, since that was the first case to
apply Gideon to evidentiary matters. Thirdly, the Court could have declared all Loper-
type convictions obtained after Gideon to be subject to attack, an alternative apparently
accepted by the Burgett [C]ourt. Finally, the Court could apply the Loper decision to
all similar cases, regardless of the date when the conviction was obtained. It was this
last alternative [that] the Loper Court accepted.
Note, Defendant's Right to Protection from Prior Uncounseled Convictions, 1973 WASH.
U.L.Q. 197, 210-11.
77. 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
78. Id. at 862.
79. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
80. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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which, if conviction resulted, imprisonment was to be imposed.
Writing for the Argersinger Court, Justice Douglas initially exam-
ined the history of the sixth amendment and then stated, "The
assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a
fair trial."8 Stressing the significance of counsel at any and all
criminal trials "where an accused is deprived of his liberty,"" Jus-
tice Douglas concluded, "We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing
and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial."83 In an important concurring
opinion, Justice Powell added, "It is clear that whenever the right-
to-counsel line is to be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent
has a right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there is a due
process right to a jury trial."84
Except for the votes in Argersinger, the voting patterns of the
"Trumpeters" and the "Pipers" in the five trial cases exactly fol-
lowed form: the "Trumpeters" voted for the right to counsel in every
instance; and the "Pipers," viewing the issues in the first four cases
as merely evidentiary, voted against the right in those cases, but
they made the voting unanimous in Argersinger. The "Swingmen,"
however, with the significant exception of Justice Powell in Loper,
did not oscillate between the two positions. Justices White and
Stewart voted for the right to counsel in all five cases, and Justice
Powell joined the majority in Argersinger, Brooks, and Herring.
Concerning retroactivity, however, although Justice Powell did not
participate in Tucker, he did join the dissenting opinions of both
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist in Loper. Thus with the
departure of Justice Douglas the future voting pattern in retroactiv-
ity decisions has been left in doubt.
From these observations and from the five cases, a number of
conclusions can be drawn regarding the right to representation in
the trial area under the Burger Court. First, as the concurring opin-
ion of Justice Powell indicated, the wording in Argersinger, read
with historical background, established an extremely broad right to
appointed counsel. 5 Secondly, as the wording in Argersinger also
81. Id. at 31.
82. Id. at 32.
83. Id. at 37.
84. Id. at 45-46 (Powell, J., concurring).
85. One commentator has stated:
Argersinger, Baldwin [v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970)], and Duncan fv. Louisiana,
392 U.S. 145 (1968)] together establish that [when a defendant is entitled to a jury trial,
or when he is charged with an offense punishable by statute with more than six months],
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indicated, albeit ambiguously, the holding in that case was meant
to be only a temporary, transitional position. 6 Thirdly, as the two
previous points suggest, the Burger Court probably will be willing
to go beyond the holding in Argersinger in at least one dramatic
direction-to vitiation, for evidentiary purposes, of uncounseled and
nonimprisonment convictions in probation or parole revocation pro-
ceedings or possibly even to vitiation of these convictions for other
purposes in other situations. Additional support for this conclusion
is found in the Burger Court's siding with the defendant in the other
four trial cases. Thus in the future, "an indigent who is denied
counsel [could] be convicted of an insignificant offense, but the
conviction [would] have only presumptive or provisional validity;
it [could not] be the predicate at any time for a significant depriva-
tion by the legal process." 8 Fourthly, in the direction of retroactiv-
ity, however, the departure of Justice Douglas and the dissent of
Justice Powell in Loper suggest that the Burger Court probably will
not be willing to go beyond the holding in Argersinger and hence will
not be willing to grant Gideon-type retroactivity to the Argersinger
holding." Finally, although the Court in all five cases showed a
concern for the defendant and the indigent and hence revealed a
clear trend for future trial cases, the Burger Court, like the Warren
Court, never confronted directly the issue of the level of indigency
that would require appointed counsel. Justice Powell, in his concur-
ring opinion in Argersinger, alluded to this problem when he stated,
"The line between indigency and assumed capacity to pay for coun-
sel is. . . somewhat arbitrary, drawn differently from State to State
and often resulting in serious inequities to accused persons."9 Thus
or [when] he is to be imprisoned in fact for any length of time, however short, he has a
constitutional right to appointed counsel. Those who have read Argersinger as approving
denial of appointed counsel merely because a jail sentence is not imposed are plainly
wrong.
Duke, supra note 30, at 607.
86. One commentator has stated:
[Tihe burden would [have been] considerable [if] the Court explicitly [had held]
the right applicable in all criminal cases. . . . [S]uch an abrupt decision would [have
wreaked] temporary chaos. Hence, the Court . . . deliberately obscured its rationale.
The obscurity gives the States a chance to gear up for the next advance and leaves
the Court free in the future to hold the right of counsel applicable "in all criminal
prosecutions."
Id. at 608-09.
87. Those other situations might encompass loss of a valuable privilege, disability to
enter a certain profession, difficulty in obtaining employment, and the presence generally of
a conviction record. See generally Rossman, supra note 30.
88. Duke, supra note 30, at 618.
89. See generally, Defendant's Right to Protection, supra note 76.
90. 407 U.S. 25, 50 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
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this problem9' demands resolution in the form of a definition of
indigency or an evaluation of procedures for determining its exist-
ence and may mark the occasion for a future decision by the Burger
Court.
C. Collateral Issues: Effective Representation and Self-
Representation
In view of the Burger Court's siding with the defendant in all
five trial cases, the Court's avoidance of the collateral question of
effective representation is almost inexplicable. Yet, the Court's very
avoidance of this issue in turn has contributed to consideration by
the Burger Court of still another collateral question, the issue of self-
representation.
(1) Effective Representation
In the three cases in this area the Burger Court relegated the
effectiveness issues to secondary status, then in effect held against
the defendants, and hence, on both counts, restricted the right to
counsel. In McMann v. Richardson2 in response to allegations of
defense counsel's inadequate consultation, mistaken grasp of law,
and inadequate preparation, Justice White, writing for the Court,
set a seemingly equitable standard for determining effectiveness
when he spoke of "the good faith evaluations of a reasonably compe-
tent attorney."93 Nevertheless, he diluted the standard by stating,
"[We] think the matter, for the most part, should be left to the
good sense and discretion of the trial courts. ... i' In closing, he
diluted the standard still further by saying that a defendant "must
demonstrate gross error on the part of counsel"9 and "prove serious
derelictions on the part of counsel."9 In Chambers v. Maroney7
Justice White again wrote for the Court, but again his opinion failed
to face squarely the question of ineffective representation. In ruling
against a petition that had alleged extremely tardy appointment, he
stated, "Unquestionably, the courts should make every effort to
91. "In one case, .. . [a] defendant was asked how much money he had in his pocket.
He replied, 'forty cents.' The judge, presumably in jest, told the defendant he 'should hire a
forty-cent lawyer.' Missing the joke, the Spanish-speaking accused was tried and convicted
without a lawyer." Duke, supra note 30, at 621.
92. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
93. Id. at 770.
94. Id. at 771.
95. Id. at 772.
96. Id. at 774.
97. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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effect early appointments of counsel in all cases. But we are not
disposed to fashion a per se rule requiring reversal of every convic-
tion following tardy appointment of counsel . . ... "I Lastly, in
Tollett v. Henderson" Justice Rehnquist in his opinion for the Court
gave short shrift to allegations of defense counsel's mistaken grasp
of fact and inadequate preparation.
The blocs voted similarly in both the effectiveness cases and the
trial cases: the "Pipers" voted against the right to counsel; the
"Trumpeters" voted for the right (except for their inexplicable and
unexplained stance in Chambers); and the "Swingmen" did not
oscillate. The decisive difference, of course, between the two sets of
cases was that the "Swingmen" generally voted for the right to
counsel in the trial cases but in every instance voted against the
right in the effectiveness cases. Thus lower courts have been left to
their own devices in the effectiveness area, and their devices in most
instances have not been sympathetic toward the defendant. 00 The
most common standard has been the "mockery of justice" test, a
standard under which, for ineffectiveness to be found, representa-
tion must have been so poor as to be considered a "farce" or a "sham
that shocks the conscience" of a court.'0 ' The reasons for this stan-
dard could be many-such as, a reluctance to reprimand attorneys
or ruin their reputations, a feeling that the problem of ineffective-
ness is too widespread or that it is insoluble, a fear that the caseload,
which is already in crisis, would cause a consequent collapse of the
criminal system, and an attitude that the convicted defendant is
guilty anyway.12 In any event, the problem of ineffectiveness 3 re-
mains real,"°4 and "[t]he 'mockery' test requires such a minimal
98. Id. at 54.
99. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
100. See, e.g., Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process,
54 MINN. L. REv. 1175 (1970).
101. See, e.g., Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1077 (1973).
102. See, e.g., Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1
(1973).
103. "[A] great many-if not most-indigent defendants do not receive the effective
assistance of counsel . . . ." Id. at 2.
104. Judge Bazelon, of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, has stated: "[Slome
of the counsel coming before the courts [are] 'walking violations of the sixth amendment.'"
Id. As examples, he has cited the following: (1) "Defense counsel advised the [trial] judge
that he could take only a few minutes for summation because he had to move his car by five
o'clock;" (2) "[d]efense counsel told the jury he had done the best he could 'with what I
have had to work with;'" and (3) "[d]efense counsel based his case on an 1895 decision;
when the [trial] judge asked for a later precedent, the attorney said that he couldn't find a
Shepard's citator." Id. at 3. And as an example of the courts' response, he has cited the
following:
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level of performance from counsel that it is itself a mockery of the
sixth amendment."'0 5 Despite this stark reality, the Burger Court
never confronted directly the issue of effective representation. One
commentator has stated, "This may be because the Court is still
developing the law on the threshold question-when and where the
right to counsel exists."'0 6 Perhaps this is true, but the more
convincing conclusion, as the three effectiveness cases indicate, is
simply that the Court did not and will not want to face directly the
question of ineffectiveness, possibly for the same reasons that the
lower courts have not wanted to face this issue. The Burger Court,
however, as the discussion of the next subject will show, was willing
to confront the problem in an indirect fashion.
(2) Self-Representation
In an apparent attempt to atone for the failure to face squarely
the question of ineffectiveness and to provide at least a partial rem-
edy by replacing poor counsel without destroying the fabric of the
criminal process, the Burger Court in Faretta v. California',7 gave
constitutional stature to the right to self-representation. Just as he
had in most of the trial cases, Justice Stewart wrote the Court
opinion. Almost immediately, he raised the issue: "The question
before us now is whether a defendant in a state criminal trial has a
constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily
and intelligently elects to do so." ' In the very next sentence, he all
but answered his question: "Stated another way, the question is
whether a State may constitutionally hale a person into its criminal
courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that
he wants to conduct his own defense."'' Then, almost as an apol-
ogy, near the end of the opinion, Justice Stewart stated, "There can
be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused to conduct his
own defense seems to cut against the grain of this Court's decisions
[In one recent case,] defense counsel was observed to be sound asleep during the
examination of prosecution witnesses . . . . If the lawyer had not been present, there
would have been a reversal without a showing of prejudice; but because the lawyer was
merely asleep, an entirely different standard was applied. The [c]ourt found that the
presence of a warm, albeit sleeping body at the defense table satisfied the defendant's
sixth amendment right.
Id. at 30.
105. Id. at 28.
106. Id. at 21.
107. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
108. Id. at 807.
109. Id.
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holding that the Constitution requires that no accused can be con-
victed and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to the
assistance of counsel."110 Additionally, he conceded that in most
instances defendants would be better served by counsel representa-
tion than by self-representation; but for historical,'" practical," '2
and philosophical reasons, Justice Stewart still ruled that defen-
dants indeed have a constitutional right to self-representation.
"'What were contrived as protections for the accused should not be
turned into fetters.' ""1
The behavior of the blocs in Faretta again paralleled the voting
patterns in the effectiveness cases and the trial cases: the "Pipers"
voted against a right to self-representation; the "Trumpeters" voted
for it; and the "Swingmen" voted together to form a third bloc. This
time, however, unlike their votes in the effectiveness cases but gen-
erally like their votes in the trial cases, the "Swingmen" voted with
the "Trumpeters." Thus the theme in this self-representation case
repeats the theme in the trial cases and again reveals the prevailing
view within the Burger Court that fairness to the defendant at trial
is the paramount priority in right to representation cases and that
this fairness will be protected rigorously by affording the defendant
the most unrestricted defense.
Because Faretta is a recent case that has received little com-
ment, a closer analysis of its intimations and implications is war-
ranted. In his Faretta dissent Justice Blackmun noted the apparent
contradictions between the position of the majority in Faretta and
the positions of majorities in earlier right to counsel cases,' 4 be-
110. Id. at 832.
111. Noting past recognition of the right of self-representation by the Supreme Court,
federal courts, and state constitutions, Justice Stewart said that the right was implicit in the
sixth amendment as applied through the fourteenth amendment and implicit also in the due
process provisions of the fifth amendment and the fourteenth amendment.
112. Among the pragmatic reasons cited by Justice Stewart were the traditional dis-
trusts of the criminal system, the possible persuasiveness of personal pleadings, and the crisis
in criminal caseloads. Also noted by Justice Stewart and by Chief Justice Burger in dissent
was the lack of a standard for effective representation.
113. 422 U.S. at 815 (quoting from Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S.
269, 279-80 (1942)).
114. Justice Blackmun's point arguably is valid, for on an earlier occasion, Justice
Stewart himself had stated, "'[L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.'
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-48 n.5 (1972). Justice Stewart, however was not
alone in assuming an apparently contradictory stance, for on an earlier occasion, Justice
Blackmun himself had stated, "The accused's right to the 'Assistance of Counsel' has meant
just that, namely, the right of the accused to have counsel acting as his assistant." United
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312 (1973). And, on an earlier occasion, Justice Rehnquist,
another Faretta dissenter, had stated, "[T]he assignment of counsel to every criminal defen-
1976]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tween the right to self-representation and the right to counsel. He
then asked,
Must every defendant be advised of his right to proceed pro se? If so, when
must that notice be given? Since the right to assistance of counsel and the right
to self-representation are mutually exclusive, how is the waiver of each right
to be measured? If a defendant has elected to exercise his right to proceed pro
se, does he still have a constitutional right to assistance of standby counsel?
How soon in the criminal proceeding must a defendant decide between pro-
ceeding by counsel or pro se? Must he be allowed to switch in midtrial? May
a violation of the right to self-representation ever be harmless error? Must the
trial court treat the pro se defendant differently than it would professional
counsel?"'
These are relevant, problematic questions, but they are not insur-
mountable obstacles; in any event, "[s]ome amount of disruption
inevitably attends any new constitutional ruling.""' Fortunately,
some of these and other tangential questions were answered, either
explicitly or implicitly, by the Court-to wit: (1) the right to self-
representation and the right to counsel are of equal stature; (2)
"'the Constitution requires that counsel [still must] be tend-
ered;' ""7 (3) the defendant "should be made aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation;""' (4) technical legal
knowledge is not relevant in determining whether to deny self-
representation; (5) "in order to represent himself, the accused
[still] must [act] 'knowingly and intelligently;'""" (6) the defen-
dant can reject counsel even after acceptance; (7) "when a defen-
dant chooses to have a lawyer manage and present his case, law and
tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding
decisions on trial strategy in many areas;' ' 20 (8) "the trial judge may
terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately en-
gages in serious and obstructionist conduct;"'' 2' (9) standby counsel
may be appointed;' 2 and (10) a pro se defendant later cannot claim
ineffective representation.'2
Still, Justice Blackmun's dissent is haunting-firstly because
dant is not mandatory; the defendant may, upon being advised of his right, determine that
he does not wish to avail himself of it." Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 501 (1972) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
115. 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.5 (1973).
117. 422 U.S. 806, 815 n.12 (quoting from Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946)).
118. Id. at 835.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 820.
121. Id. at 834 n.46.
122. Id. at 835 n.46 & 846 n.7 (majority opinion & Burger, C.J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 834-35 n.46 & 841 (majority opinion & Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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it casts doubt on the rationale of the Court opinion, secondly be-
cause it raises some questions for the future that went unanswered
by the Court, and thirdly because it provokes other, unasked ques-
tions for the future. First, with respect to one of the Court's underly-
ing assumptions, Justice Blackmun stated, "[T]he historical evi-
dence seems to me to be inconclusive in revealing the original under-
standing of the language of the Sixth Amendment. ' ' 24 Support for
his conclusion abounds.12s Thus the Court's real rationale must have
been premised only on the philosophical theme of fairness at trial
and on pragmatic considerations. Support also abounded for em-
ploying these pragmatic considerations as justifications for a right
to self-representation. Among these practical reasons were again the
absence of an equitable effectiveness standard and the presence of
a legitimate desire in defendants to represent themselves, this desire
being founded on distrust of the criminal system, 26 political or
moral beliefs, 1 and the tactical advantages of personal pleadings. 128
Secondly, with respect to Justice Blackmun's unanswered issues for
the future, various commentators have suggested resolutions to
those four key unanswered questions regarding notice of the right to
self-representation, 12 waiver of the right to counsel representa-
tion,1 31 termination of the right to self-representation before and
124. Id. at 850.
125. See, e.g., Steele, supra note 27, at 489-90; Comment, Self-Representation in Crimi-
nal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CAUF. L. REV. 1479, 1487 (1971). But
see 64 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 240, 244-45 (1973) ("[Alithough the right [of self-
representation] was rarely articulated as such, it was widely acknowledged and cherished as
a fundamental right. The Puritans who settled in Massachusetts Bay brought with them a
hatred of lawyers that was exceeded only by their love and fear of God.").
126. See generally The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, supra note 125; 64 J. CraM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 240 (1973).
127. "To say that [a political or a moral] purpose is an improper use of the judicial
system is overly simplistic. If an allegedly criminal act is motivated by moral or political
beliefs, those beliefs may be relevant both in determining the defendant's intent and, per-
haps, as evidence of mitigating circumstances." The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, supra
note 125, at 1481 n.16.
128. "[Olbjections to these kinds of tactical advantages derive not from their use by
a pro se defendant, but from their apparent deviance from the truth-finding norm. As such,
they are neither more nor less justified than the analogous devices employed by attorneys."
Id. at 1505 n.145.
129. "[If the right to proceed pro se is "correlative' to the right to proceed with
counsel, and if it is 'inherent' and 'unqualified,' then it would certainly seem that the defen-
dant should have express notice." Collateral Issues, supra note 100, at 1186.
130. One commentator has stated:
A record silent as to a defendant's age, education, employment history, and prior expo-
sure to courtroom procedures, as well as to his willingness to accept counsel for consulta-
tion purposes notwithstanding that he wishes to conduct his own defense, and his
awareness of the nature of the charges, including possible defenses, is devoid of virtually
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during trial, 3 ' and the responsibility of standby counsel. 13 2 Lastly,
the more interesting, unasked questions for the future that will be
provoked by the Court's opinion are those concerning retroactivity,
the choice by the indigent defendant of his own counsel, and the
mixing of self-representation and counsel representation-the latter
two being issues that were rejected by the trial court but not dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court in Faretta. In regard to retroactivity,
again the departure of Justice Douglas and the dissent of Justice
Powell in Loper suggest that the Burger Court may be willing to
grant only prospective application to the holding in Faretta.1'1 An
even dimmer future seems likely for the proposition that an indigent
defendant will be allowed to choose his own appointed counsel.
With both these predictions, however, and especially with the next
prediction, one constitutional tendency should be recognized-"the
tendency of all rights 'to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme.' ,,'31 Cognizance of this tendency should be maintained
particularly in this, a trial area in which the Burger Court has so
many times sided with the defendant. Finally, although many
practical reasons have been advanced for allowing the hybrid situa-
tion of both self-representation and counsel representation,' '5 the
most convincing argument, a philosophical one, was conceived by
Angela Davis: "[Ain either/or situation flies in the face of justice,
because if one right can be exercised only when the other is ren-
ounced, it would appear to me that these are not rights at all.'
'1
36
Thus logic would seem to demand and consistent application of two
constitutional rights would seem to command the allowance of si-
multaneous self-representation and counsel representation.'
37
all the information necessary for the trial court to determine whether the defendant's
waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent.
Note, The Pro Se Defendant's Right to Counsel, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 927, 935-36 (1972).
131. "Differentiating between requests made before and during trial cannot . . . be
justified .... The right [of self-representation] should be either absolute or never
absolute." Collateral Issues, supra note 100, at 1184.
132. "The attorney's civil and professional liability [should] be made commensurate
[only] with the role he fulfills." The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, supra note 125, at
1511.
133. Contra, People v. Holcomb, 395 Mich. 326, 235 N.W.2d 343 (1975) (granting re-
troactivity to Faretta holding).
134. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611-12 (1974) (quoting from Hudson County Water
Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908)).
135. See, e.g., The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, supra note 125, at 1507-09.
136. Id. at 1507.
137. "[If both the pro se defendant and the integrity of the system benefit from
allowing him access to counsel, a stronger interest than some vague notion that he is getting
away with too much should be demonstrated before denying joint representation." Id. at 1512.
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D. Post-trial and Trial Type
In these related areas the Burger Court decided three cases, all
of which were important as either limitations on or extensions of the
right to counsel; only one, however, was a typical decision, because
the other two were in effect unanimous decisions.
In Ross v. Moffitt,'35 a 6-3 decision in which the "Trumpeters"
dissented, the Court dealt with post-trial settings, and in Gagnon
v. Scarpellil3l and Wolff v. McDonnell,'40 the Court again dealt with
post-trial but also trial type settings. Whereas the issue in Douglas
had concerned the right to appointed counsel on appeals as of right,
the Court in Ross faced the question of right to appointed counsel
for discretionary appeal and for review by the United States Su-
preme Court. In his opinion for the Ross Court, Justice Rehnquist
rejected the petitioner's equal protection argument on both counts
by stating, "The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as a
shield to protect him against being 'haled into court' by the State
and stripped of his presumption of innocence, but rather as a sword
to upset the prior determination of guilt." ' In Gagnon, the Court
addressed the issue of right to appointed counsel at probation or
parole revocation hearings."' Justice Powell spoke in effect for an
unanimous Burger Court and initially determined, as had the War-
ren Court in Gault with respect to juvenile proceedings, that proba-
tion or parole revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions
and hence not sixth amendment prosecutions: "[T]here are critical
differences between criminal trials and probation or parole revoca-
tion hearings, and both society and the probationer or parolee have
stakes in preserving these differences."'4 Nevertheless, in balancing
the interests of society and individuals, which due process reasoning
demands, Justice Powell also found that the loss of liberty that
revocation would entail was an important individual interest. Thus
in a Court opinion that echoed his earlier concurring opinion in
Argersinger, Justice Powell concluded that the right to appointed
Contra, United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975) (rejecting concept of hybrid
situation).
138. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
139. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
140. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
141. 417 U.S. 600, 610-11 (1974).
142. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Court had held that parolees are
entitled to due process hearings in parole revocation proceedings; and earlier in Gagnon, the
Court had held that probationers are entitled to due process hearings in probation revocation
proceedings.
143. 411 U.S. 778, 788-89 (1973).
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counsel at probation or parole revocation hearings should be deter-
mined on a case by case basis, with regard to be given to the pecu-
liarities of the particular case.' In Wolff prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings were challenged in a class action. In his opinion for the
Court, Justice White also initially determined, "Prison disciplinary
proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full
panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not
apply.""' Also applying due process reasoning, he too spoke of bal-
ancing interests, important circumstances, and reasonable
accommodations. He found, however, that deprivation of good time
is not a grievous loss for a prison inmate. Thus although he specified
some procedural reform, Justice White concluded, "At this stage of
the development of these procedures we are not prepared to hold
that inmates have a right to either retained or appointed counsel in
disciplinary proceedings."' 46 Although three dissenters, the "Trum-
peters," favored more procedural reform, they agreed with the coun-
sel holding. As a final measure, Justice White closed the past but
opened the future, for he refused to accord retroactivity to the speci-
fied procedural reform'47 but also said the reform was "not graven
in stone"'4 and was subject to possible future expansion.
Unfortunately, the only conclusive statements that can be
made concerning the voting patterns in this area are that the three
blocs voted as three blocs and that all of the "Swingmen" voted with
all of the "Pipers" in each case. The "Pipers" did vote against the
right tocounsel in two of the three cases, and the "Trumpeters" did
vote for the right in two of the three cases; but it is the votes of the
"Pipers" in Gagnon and the votes of the "Trumpeters" in Wolff that
are somewhat disturbing. Even more disturbing are the votes of the
"Swingmen," especially Justices White and Stewart. For example,
144. Justice Powell stated:
[C]ounsel should be provided in cases where, after being informed of his right to request
counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colora-
ble claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon
which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is
uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and
make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult
to develop or present. In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, the
responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the proba-
tioner appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself.
Id. at 790-91.
145. 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
146. Id. at 570.
147. Justice White also strongly implied that retroactivity should not be given to the
holding in Gagnon.
148. 418 U.S. 539, 572 (1974).
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Justice White had shown no dislike for the holding in Douglas"' yet
voted against the right to counsel in Ross, and Justice Stewart had
shown antipathy for the holding in Gault'5" yet voted for the right
in Gagnon. Perhaps all this merely indicates that the votes of the
"Pipers" and the "Trumpeters" can be predicted almost all of the
time and that the votes of the "Swingmen" can be predicted most
of the time.
Once again, however, from these observations and from the
three cases, a number of conclusions can be drawn regarding the
right to representation in this area under the Burger Court. First,
unlike the Warren Court, the Burger Court in this area is unwilling
to look outside due process to either the sixth amendment or the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment'51 for a ration-
ale for the right to counsel. Thus any notion that equal protection
can be employed to expand radically the right to counsel'5 2 should
be dismissed precisely because this notion is radical.'5 3 Secondly, for
the pragmatic present, as the rationales and holdings of Gagnon and
Wolff reveal, the Burger Court does not seem disposed even under
due process to expand rapidly the right to counsel in this area.'54
Finally, however, for the philosophical future, as those two cases
also reveal, the Burger Court is willing to engage in due procees
balancing and to recognize the evolving nature of due pro-
cess' 55-and it is willing particularly to grant the right to counsel
149. See note 26 supra.
150. Id.
151. Cf. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) (Court held state statute that narrowly
sought repayment by indigents of fees paid by state to appointed counsel was not violative
of equal protection). But cf. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (Court held state statute
that broadly sought repayment by indigents of fees paid by state to appointed counsel was
violative of equal protection).
152. The extremes to which equal protection reasoning can be carried are exemplified
by the following propositions: "It seems doubtful. . . that an accused should be expected to
sell a . . . television set before he can be considered financially unable to employ counsel.
Families on welfare often have [television sets] and consider them necessaries." Duke, supra
note 30, at 629. "The mere fact that [a civil] plaintiff initiates [an] action should not be
significant." The Continuing Expansion, supra note 9, at 489.
153. "The reluctance of the Court to rely more heavily on equal protection . . . perhaps
reflects its uneasiness with an approach so lacking in standards or inherent limits." Clark,
Gideon Revisited, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 343, 352 (1973).
154. One commentator has stated:
[It seems clear that some line must be drawn-extension of the right to every criminal
. . . case seems not only unlikely but also unnecessary and undesirable. The right, in
its extreme, should not extend beyond that point at which the consequences are so
minimal or the proceeding so simplified that a non-indigent person would not hire an
attorney.
The Continuing Expansion, supra note 9, at 487-88.
155. One commentator has stated:
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when a loss of liberty might ensue because, while it restricted the
right to counsel in Wolff, the Burger Court extended the right in
Gagnon. Thus because the consequences-loss of liberty-of proba-
tion or parole revocations and of civil commitments might be the
same, the Burger Court might extend the right to counsel to pro-
ceedings concerning commitment for mental illness, drug depend-
ence, alcoholism, and communicable disease. '6 And this may be
true even though civil commitment proceedings are not criminal
prosecutions. 157
IV. FINALE: THE CONCLUSION
Justice Clark, a former member of the Warren Court, recently
stated:
[Clivilizations will be judged by the protections their criminal justice systems
afford those charged with crime. Some say that our system is too protective,
but I submit that it is one of our society's greatest strengths; and its strongest
tenet is that the feared, the despised and the powerless must be protected
equally with the mighty, the rich and the beloved. The availability of counsel
for all kinds of people . . . has a direct effect upon freedom and the rights of
every individual. .... ,'l
This statement typifies the attitude of the Warren Court during the
six years after Gideon. Accordingly, the Warren Court was willing
to look not only to the sixth amendment and to due process but also
to the self-incrimination provision of the fifth amendment and to
the equal protection clause, in order to recognize a right to counsel
both before and after trial, at interrogations and identifications, and
on sentencing and appeal.
Normally, the Supreme Court attempts to maintain a balance between what it foresees
as constitutionally desirable, and what it senses to be presently practical. For this
purpose, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides a convenient tool.
The due process clause allows the Court to posit a principle [that] is realistic for the
time, and yet remains sufficiently flexible to accommodate some future extension of the
principle ....
Steele, supra note 27, at 492.
156. See generally Note, Civil Commitments: Should There Be a Constitutional Right
to Counsel, 2 CAPITAL U.L. REv. 126 (1973).
157. One commentator has stated:
The fact that the philosophical rationale behind the criminal sanctions are not the
moving force behind civil commitment does not necessarily compel a conclusion that
there is no right to counsel for civil commitments. Quite the contrary, application of due
process analysis-apart from any sixth amendment consideration-demands that coun-
sel be appointed. In the context of a proceeding with a consequence of such magnitude
no other conclusion would be consonant with the balancing of interests involved in a due
process analysis.
Rossman, supra note 30, at 650.
158. Clark, supra note 153, at 343.
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Six years and sixteen cases into the era of the Burger Court, two
new patterns emerged. The first pattern was a voting pattern, in
which one solid bloc of three Justices carried forward the liberal
legacy of the Warren Court and its interest in the individual, an-
other solid bloc of three Justices bore the banner of society and
government, and a third solid bloc of three Justices oscillated be-
tween the two positions to make majorities. This voting pattern
produced a seemingly chaotic eight to eight split in the sixteen right
to representation cases. On analysis, however, this pattern proved
to be not so chaotic, for the common thread that emerged from the
cases was the attitude of the "Swingmen," an attitude that recog-
nized fairness at trial as a paramount priority. This attitude also in
turn produced a second, situational pattern, in which the Burger
Court was willing to look only to the sixth amendment in the
pretrial area and only to due process in the post-trial area, and in
which the Court was unwilling to recognize a right to counsel in
some instances in either area.
From these two patterns, the tune of the Burger Court finally
can be recognized: when a defendant is faced with the prospect of a
trial-like confrontation and with a possible loss of liberty, the right
to representation-the right to retained counsel or to appointed
counsel or to neither if the defendant so desires-is inviolable. Thus
in the trial area, much will be afforded to the defendant in order to
assure fairness, but in the pretrial and post-trial/trial type areas,
only certain limited contingencies will cause the Court to side with
the defendant. For example, to assure fairness, the Court may man-
date cautionary jury instructions at trial to protect against mistaken
pretrial identifications or may grant a right to counsel at civil com-
mitment proceedings. This was the tune of the Burger Court before
the departure of Justice Douglas, but even now, after his departure,
because two members of his group still remain and because all three
"Swingmen" still remain, this tune will continue to be played by the
Burger Court in the right to representation cases.' 9
DAVID M. THOMPSON
159. Although the above analysis indicates that most future votes by the Burger Court
in this constitutional area, without a ninth Justice, would be either 5-3 for or 6-2 against a
right to representation, a brief look at the previous voting record and tendencies of the new
ninth Justice is warranted. While serving on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for 5 years,
new Justice Stevens participated in 11 important decisions in this constitutional area. In 9
of those cases, he voted against a right to representation. Four of those cases, however,
concerned the frequently avoided question of effective representation, and 3 others concerned
tangential Wolff-like issues. Only 4 cases then truly reveal his attitude, and in those cases,
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he voted twice for and twice against a right to representation. In Springer v. United States,
460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting), a pretrial
decision, and in Macon v. Lash, 458 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1972), a post-trial decision, Justice
Stevens sided with the defendant; and in Holmes v. United States, 452 F.2d 249 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972), and in Sturges v. United States ex rel. Kirby, 510
F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1975), both pretrial decisions, Justice Stevens sided against the defendant.
See Special Project, The One Hundred and First Justice: An Analysis of the Opinions of
Justice John Paul Stevens, Sitting as Judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 29
VAND. L. REv. 125, 157-62, 202-04 (1976). Thus the voting position of Justice Stevens appears
to reside somewhere between the positions of the "Swingmen" and the "Pipers:"
How does Justice Stevens define a constitutional right? For him, individual rights exist
within the context of competing state interests and policies. He looks closely at the
interest the individual asserts and then balances it against the state's interest. . . . One
consequence of this approach is a narrow definition of those interests of constitutional
dimension. In all, Justice Stevens acts with restraint in considering questions of consti-
tutional scope and gives the states latitude to try varying solutions to such questions.
This restraint appears to stem primarily from a conservative view of the judiciary's
proper role in our government. ...
Id. at 195-96.
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